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The interdisciplinary field of memory studies has 
tended in recent years to diverge into two direc-
tions: on the one hand, the study of memorials, 
monuments, rituals and commemorations, adapt-
ing theories of space, construed through notions 
of »collective memory« and »affective memory«; 
and on the other hand, a psychoanalytic model of 
translation between »traumatic memory« and nar-
rative memory«, dominated by an approach to the 
value of narrative as cure. While these approaches 
often cross over into each other, generating com-
pelling insights, they tend to be informed by what 
we could call a presentist approach to memory. 
This tends to position the present, however em-
battled, as a potentially stabilising recovery of the 
past. Having learned and adapted much from both 
approaches, I nevertheless regard my work with 
memory as a slight departure. Preoccupied with 
works of cultural production, mainly film and lit-
erature, arising out of the sixteen-year civil war in 
Lebanon, I am concerned more with a fragmenting 
force of memory situated as an irresolvable, irrec-
oncilable, productive tension between what comes 
to be re-covered as present and past, i.e., neither 
from the vantage point of »the« present nor from 
that of »the« past. My current research develops 
and applies this notion of memory. 
Keywords 
fragmenting force of memory; presentist; disme-
mory; civil war; amnesty; amnesia; reconciliation; 
remains; dis-inhabiting.
Introduction
The following paper consists of an edited version of 
a larger essay on Jean Makdisi’s Beirut Fragments: 
A War Memoir, written during the Lebanese civil 
war (1975-1990), and published in 1990, almost on 
the eve of the war’s formal resolution. Makdisi was 
born in Jerusalem, a few years before the creation 
of Israel and the concomitant loss of the Palesti-
nian homeland. As part of the Palestinian exodus, 
she subsequently settled with her family in Cairo, 
where she grew up. She later lived in North Ame-
rica, and then moved to Beirut in 1972, where she 
had a teaching post at one of the universities.
As part of our research on memory in cultu-
ral production arising out of the civil war and its 
uncertain aftermath, my paper here on Makdisi’s 
memoir relates to the recently awarded ZMO 
project Transforming Memories: Cultural Produc-
tion and Personal/Public Memory in Lebanon and 
Morocco,1 in collaboration with UMAM Documen-
tation and Research, in Lebanon. Before going on 
to provide some theoretical signposts for my paper, 
I want to give an indication of the context in which 
Makdisi’s memoir is embedded, a context that is 
also embodied by the style of her composition.
The civil war – or series of wars, battles, kid-
nappings, massacres and assassinations that took 
place between 1975 and 1990 – has given rise to 
a prodigious amount of cultural work in Lebanon. 
This is evident in fictional and autobiographical 
prose, feature and documentary film and video, 
photography, installation and sculpture, and to a 
lesser extent theatre and performance. A recent 
1 http://www.zmo.de/forschung/projekte_2008/Transforming_
Memories.html. In its present form this paper benefits from 
initial feedback from Sonja Hegasy and Kai Kresse, and I 
look forward to further comments and suggestions.  
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More specifically, my paper here is concerned 
with how Makdisi’s memoir can be read as a site 
for what could be called a fragmenting force of 
memory whose scope and exigency can be cont-
rasted to an official, strategic and reconciliatory 
production of dismemory that works as a political 
currency of forgetfulness. As a fragmenting force, 
Makdisi’s approach to memory resists a notion of 
reconciliation based on the employment of amnesty 
as a formal production of amnesia, in respect to 
Lebanon’s General Amnesty Law of 1991. With the 
help of the work of Paul Ricoeur, I try to sketch 
a critical approach to the intertwined, etymologi-
cally related terms amnesty and amnesia, unsett-
ling their »pact of secrecy« (Ricoeur). Makdisi’s 
memoir is read as an alternative to this officially 
sanctioned, though troubled, forgetfulness.
I have mentioned hermeneutics and phenomeno-
logy, and have to say that, far from assuming them 
as definitive intellectual movements and settled 
conceptual terms of reference, I grapple with them 
as appropriate research frameworks to situate 
my subject matter and my approach. Part of this 
grappling concerns a tension between the parti-
cular use-value of concepts and their investment 
and broader circulation as currencies of intellec-
tual exchange – an irresolvable tension that I feel 
is well worth hanging on to, if one’s research is not 
to be relieved of the epistemological, ontological 
and ethical tremors of its own circumstances.
It seems to me that a key term is appropriate, as 
it has a manifold sense of both rendering something 
adequate or suitable to the terms of its address 
or its use and of taking  something away, as in to 
steal or borrow. In a certain sense, to critically 
address, say, a work of literature or film is to ap-
propriate it from the historical context or symbolic 
network in which it is embedded, in the process 
rendering it adequate to the force of conceptu-
al understanding. Phenomenologically, it is only 
through such appropriation that the work can at 
all be critically approached, rendered a meaning-
ful pursuit. And yet to »bracket off« historical con-
text is not to overlook that context, but rather to 
render its force available for critical inquiry. Her-
meneutically, it is well worth considering that any 
work of cultural production is already enmeshed in 
variable, differentiating, subjectifying networks 
of power, desire, sexuality – social production and 
exchange more generally – and contributes to the 
ways by which such networks are constitutively 
experienced and negotiated. As works of literature 
and film are already enmeshed in networks and 
modalities of social exchange, their critical appro-
priation (I won’t say theft) can only be always late, 
amounting to what Zygmunt Bauman once called a 
»secondary hermeneutics«. 
A central question for my work at the moment is 
as follows: How does a particular work of cultural 
production employ memory to destructure both an 
spate of fiction and film situating the civil war 
suggests an open, simmering wound that has not 
been adequately represented, nurtured and cared 
for by the Lebanese state and political elite. And 
yet it is remarkable that much of this cultural pro-
duction is highly experimental, rarely presented 
in straightforward realist guise, but somehow al-
ways keen to foreground the conventions of form, 
to render the work and its subjective impulses as 
process rather than a finished, self-contained form 
of representation.
While there are to be sure interesting and com-
pelling works produced with more straightforward 
narrative styles and forms of presentation, for the 
moment my research is preoccupied with develo-
ping a hermeneutic, phenomenological approach 
to the more experimental forms of cultural produc-
tion that situate and to some extent work through 
personal experiences of the war. Significantly, the 
very style of this work somehow embodies and 
critically situates, I suggest, a refusal to packa-
ge and normalise any ideal(ised) understanding 
of the war. Arguably, this refusal is a condition of 
the absence of institutional forms of political care 
and nurture addressing the war, and a search for a 
corresponding change of formal and informal po-
litical culture.
As part of this prodigious output, Makdisi’s me-
moir was not only written and published in the 
midst of extreme violence and civil strife, but also 
without any end in sight. Although we may well 
approach and read her memoir as an artifact of 
history – whether this be social, cultural, or lite-
rary history – her fragmentary, episodic style re-
sists a reading informed by an expectation of be-
ginnings and endings. This is not to dismiss the 
historiographical or existential value of marking 
off beginnings and endings, but rather to obser-
ve how her discontinuous style emerges from her 
existential plight and constitutes an approach to 
make some sense of her experience. The severe 
contractions of time and space (the evaporation of 
hope, the restrictions on physical movement) that 
many endured during the war weave themselves 
into Makdisi’s narrative style.  
Employing various forms of composition, 
Makdisi’s nine fragments embody various tempo-
ral rhythms: chronological notation of significant 
events; diary-like accounts of immediate experi-
ence; a »glossary« of Arabic terms the Beirutis 
used to describe the significance of their situati-
on, towards naming and coping with the »horror«; 
an autobiographical »self-portrait« wedged in the 
middle of the book; a reflective account of the 1992 
Israeli invasion; another diary sequence, this time 
less immediate and punctuated by the inscription 
of dates; and finally, a peculiar, annotated alpha-
bet in reverse, ending with »Beirut pleads to be 
redeemed, but not by Another Army.« 
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events – battles between Palestinians and the Ka-
taeb; Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon and 
its eventual siege of Beirut; evacuation of the PLO; 
Sabra and Shatila massacres; assassinations of 
prominent figures; battles in eastern and western 
Beirut (BF, 11-15). Makdisi’s chronology ends in Ja-
nuary 1990, with Beirut still in the grip of violence, 
remnants of the Lebanese army battling with the 
Lebanese Forces in the east, while the two most 
prominent Shia movements, Amal and Hezbollah, 
fight on the western side of the city. In early 1990 
the Taif Accord that was to eventually define a po-
litical framework for cessation of armed conflict 
had yet to be finalised and agreed upon by the 
various militias and parties. The following year, 
in August 1991, the newly formed Lebanese par-
liament ushered in by the Accord passed the con-
tentious General Amnesty Law, which effectively 
worked to suspend any possibility of legal procee-
dings brought against participants, militia leaders 
or combatants of the civil war. While the Amnesty 
Law cannot of course be included in the timeline 
of Makdisi’s chronology, in retrospect its prescrip-
tion of historical amnesia can be contrasted to the 
force and value of memory informing her memoir. 
As their phonetic resonance suggests, the terms 
amnesty and amnesia have an etymological link, 
deriving from ancient Greek terms for forgetful-
ness. Amnesty has come to relate more to a sense 
of formally granted forgiveness, mostly by the sta-
te, as a pardon for past offenses. Curiously, am-
nesty is practiced as both a form of »governmen-
tality« – as a broad network of political process, 
an »art of government« encompassing »tactics and 
techniques«3 for the production and regulation of 
political culture – and as an exercise of sovereign-
ty, as when a president of a state grants a pardon 
with an almost arbitrary wave of a hand. But whe-
ther as supreme fiat or an art of government, what 
is significant about the practice of amnesty is that 
the forgiveness it grants does not necessarily lead 
to forgetting, as the very process of identifying 
and pardoning perpetrators works to maintain 
both official and popular forms of memory. Con-
versely, amnesia relates to a loss of memory, an 
incapacity to remember past events and experien-
ces, an incapacity to situate the present as a vanta-
ge point from which to render the past memorable. 
A colloquial Arabic saying captures this sense of 
amnesia as incapacity to manage time. The saying 
describes the loss of consciousness as a »fall into 
3 These are of course Foucault’s terms. See his lecture of 
February 1, in Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Popula-
tion: Lectures at the College de France 1977-1978. Edited by 
Michel Senellart. Translated by Graham Burchell. Picador, 
New York, 2007. Foucault’s genealogy of governmentality 
more or less hinges on a distinction from sovereignty, al-
though he recognises that it is not simply a case of historical 
substitution of one form of government for another.
historical understanding of self and related mo-
dalities of being? In engaging a phenomenological 
approach to this employment of memory, I am thus 
not so much interested (at least not as a point of 
departure) in »how societies remember« (the tit-
le of a book by Paul Connerton) – how rites and 
ritual, commemorations and memorials substan-
tiate embodied, lingering modalities of identifica-
tion and belonging. I am rather more interested in 
what writers, filmmakers and artists do with me-
mory, particularly in respect to their works of cul-
tural production that can be situated as remnants, 
leftovers, undigested remains, of the civil war. If 
this work cannot be directly regarded as »real en-
vironments of memory« (Pierre Nora’s term, which 
he dismisses out of hand), then it can be addressed 
as an unravelling of the threads of memory, self 
and social modality. Although Nora’s work has had 
some influence on postcolonial studies addressing 
the politics of memory in respect to monuments 
and memorials, particularly concerning war, his 
conceptual scope is too structuralist for my intel-
lectual taste and personal temperament (for Nora, 
it seems, archives and monuments, not people, re-
member), while the geographical scope of his work 
is restricted by its nationalist agenda. This is not 
to dismiss a critical appreciation of the sociali-
sing, incorporating, collectivising force of memo-
ry as habituating (the »performance of codes and 
rules«, Connerton says), but rather to rehabilitate 
narrative as a site of memory emerging through 
the dis-inhabiting impulses of experimental cultu-
ral production. 
Memory is the last gasp of life...Here in this sea 
of despair and waste and 
sadness that is Beirut, events call up moments 
that flash out of my past and 
interpret the present. I am led by them through 
a corridor of mirrors into 
which I have wandered, looking for understan-
ding. Impelled by my own
private agony as I flail against the overwhel-
ming and pitiless force of
things around me, I am brought up short some-
times by the reflection and
sometimes by the reality. I cannot always tell 
which.
Jean Said Makdisi, Beirut Fragments2
I
Jean Said Makdisi’s Beirut Fragments is subtitled 
A War Memoir and was published in 1990 on the 
eve of the formal ending of the civil war in Leba-
non. It opens with a chronological table of the main 
2 Jean Said Makdisi, Beirut Fragments: A War Memoir. Per-
sea Books, New York, 1990, 97. Hereafter cited as BF.
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missions can be regarded as an art of government 
that »has the population as its target«.7 From an 
anthropological point of view they can also be re-
garded as a rite or ritual toward the purification of 
community, interrupting a cycle of violence based 
on vengeance and revenge. Although he doesn’t 
address institutionalised processes of truth and 
reconciliation, this is a compelling argument by 
René Girard, who makes the interesting observa-
tion that non-juridical »curative procedures« are 
designed not merely to identify perpetrators, but 
to placate victims, »since it is the latter who pose 
the most immediate threat«.8 Taking myth and 
Greek tragedy as examples, Girard argues that 
curative processes work to transform »reciprocal 
violence« into »unanimous violence«, stabilised 
through the symbolic production of a »surrogate 
victim«. This victim is rendered both profane and 
sacred – profane, because the victim is regarded 
as a polluting substance that must be expelled if 
the community is to purify itself and regain sym-
bolic unity; sacred, because through this process 
it comes to be endowed with the symbolic force 
of a saviour: »From the purely religious point of 
view,« Girard observes, »the surrogate victim – or, 
more simply, the final victim – inevitably appears 
as a being who submits to violence without pro-
voking a reprisal; a supernatural being who sows 
violence to reap peace; a mysterious savior who 
visits affliction on mankind in order subsequently 
to restore it to good health«.9 As both poison and 
remedy, we could say, the surrogate victim works 
as a sort of »pharmakon«10 – a necessary ambiva-
lence (undecidable as either perpetrator or victim, 
but somehow reconciling this opposition) or sup-
plement that serves to maintain both the viability 
of a symbolic border between inside and outside, 
the pure and the polluted, and its transgression, a 
porous leaking and absorption.  
While this, to be sure, requires a nuanced appre-
ciation of particular circumstances in which victim-
hood (without which the very process of truth and 
reconciliation makes no sense) gains significance 
and symbolic value as political currency, with the 
wave of a hand Lebanon’s General Amnesty Law 
sidesteps the issue of victims and victimhood al-
together. As Nizah Saghieh, a civil rights activist, 
argued at a conference in Beirut in 2005 on transi-
tional justice and post-conflict strategies in Leba-
7 Foucault, op. cit., 108.
8 Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred. Translated by Pa-
trick Gregory. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 
1979, 21.
9 Ibid, 86. No doubt Girard’s universalising scheme re-
quires much unpacking.
10 See Jacques Derrida, »Plato’s Pharmacy«. In his Dis-
semination. Translated by Barbara Johnson. The University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1981. As Derrida observes, »The 
character of the pharmakos has been compared to a scape-
goat«, 130.
time« (or a fall into the clock or hour – both terms 
having a common Arabic designation), meaning a 
loss of a capacity to distinguish between a before 
and an after, the loss of a capacity to maintain self-
awareness through reference to time.
But more to the point, when drawn together 
and situated as political currency, the terms am-
nesty and amnesia imply a strategic force of what 
I want to call dismemory.4 Recognising amnesty as 
a craft of state, Paul Ricoeur for example defines 
it as »institutional forgetting«. He writes that the 
»proximity...between amnesty and amnesia signals 
the existence of a secret pact with the denial of 
memory«.5 In Lebanon this secret pact is peculi-
ar in that the Amnesty Law does not provide any 
avenue to specifically identify and name those who 
are to receive the benefit of political pardon and 
forgiveness. Consequently, the all too generalizing 
scope of the Amnesty Law structures an economy 
of manifold amnesia that productively works to si-
tuate events, experiences, actions and incidents of 
the civil war beyond any formal means of redress 
or accountability. 
For my purposes I want to approach the link bet-
ween amnesty and amnesia as a constitutive pact 
designed not so much as a »denial of memory«, but 
more for the production of dismemory, structuring 
a formal politics of deliberate, convenient forget-
fulness. And this relates not merely to a particular 
way of situating the past, but more significantly 
in respect to stabilising the present as a vantage 
point through and from which to disremember the 
past. Looked at this way, it thus becomes possi-
ble to think of amnesia as not only an incapacity 
to remember, but also as a strategy of dismemory 
– a strategy to preserve and prevent the present 
from exposing itself to the past. It further becomes 
possible to consider the relationship between pre-
sent and past as not merely an exigency of present 
concerns to interpretively position the value and 
significance of past events and experiences, but 
also in terms of how the past remains an indistinct 
force that may well work to disrupt such strategies 
invested in preserving the present from exposing 
itself to the past. 
Ricoeur goes on to say that »the aim of amnesty is 
the reconciliation of enemy citizens, civil peace«.6 
His notion here of reconciliation suggests that am-
nesty is concerned not so much with a juridical 
processing of particular instances of criminality, 
as with the constitution of a citizenry and com-
mitment to the rehabilitation of communal, civic 
and political order. Truth and reconciliation com-
4 I am inspired here by Toni Morrison’s term »disremem-
bered«, in her novel Beloved. Vintage, London, 1997.
5 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting. Translated by 
K. Blamey and D. Pellauer. The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 2006, 453.
6 Ibid.
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sure to the past, the fragmentary, paratactic force 
of Makdisi’s memoir works to render the present 
open to the past, situates the present in a way that 
it can receive the address of residues and remain-
ders that may well work to destabilise the present 
as an investment in dismemory secured through 
the political currency of reconciliation.
Dispossessing Memory
It is customary to speak of memory as an inten-
tional capacity, or else as a possession. The past 
answers, fits and measures up to, what we set out 
in the present to remember, to recollect. Gramma-
tically, one is mostly constrained to speak of me-
mory in terms of a personal or possessive pronoun, 
as in »my memories«, »a group’s or nation’s memo-
ry«, »her memory«. Over and against this posses-
sive register, Proust in his novel Remembrance of 
Things Past gave much attention to how the body 
carries memory in ways that are less than volun-
tary. Hence his distinction between memoire vo-
lontaire and memoire involontaire, best described 
by his famous, much-quoted example of the petite 
madeleine. One of the main themes of Proust’s no-
vel is precisely a working through of the will to 
possession, as the young Marcel first strives to 
capture and possess his love object, Albertine, or 
else control the way others regard him. Part of 
this critique is to appreciate how one is not always 
in possession of oneself, affected as one is by an 
»interior monologue«, »the internal dialogue of 
memories and the incessant verbiage of sleep«,14 a 
phrase that could well have been written by Freud. 
Although Proust, especially in the early parts of 
his novel, tends to focus his deliberations through 
a subjectivist lens,15 his insights, like much of Eu-
ropean realism, lend themselves to a sociological 
understanding of the ways by which customs, ha-
bits and performance locate and enable capacities 
for social exchange (such as Marcel’s attempts to 
enter and participate in high society, which ne-
cessitates a capacity to demonstrate appropriate 
forms of corporal and verbal etiquette). Proust’s 
notion of memoire involontaire, or what has also 
been termed »affective memory«, provides a sense 
of how one is possessed by the inchoate reverbe-
ration of residues and remainders, how it is more 
a question of how one is re-membered or dis-mem-
bered by the gathering/scattering, integrating or 
disintegrating force of memory. Again, within a 
sociological framework of inquiry, what Paul Con-
14 Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past: Volume 2. 
Translated by C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin. 
Penguin Books, London, 1981, 1014.
15 For example: »Even when one is no longer attached to 
things, it’s still something to have been attached to them; 
because it was always for reasons which other people didn’t 
grasp. The memory of those feelings is something that’s to 
be found only in ourselves; we must go back into ourselves to 
look at it.« Ibid, 729, my emphasis. 
non, »the victim was repeatedly marginalized and 
responsibilities for the violence were overlooked 
by amnesty laws after the war«.11 Designed in the 
main to allow militia and party leaders to maintain 
political privileges, the Amnesty Law did not arise 
out of any curative process, such as a truth and 
reconciliation commission. It rather incorporates 
a form of reconciliation produced more through an 
arbitrary exercise of sovereignty, designed to re-
habilitate not so much a diffuse and differentiated 
political culture, as the discrete privileges of a po-
litical elite. As Makdisi, in another context, wryly 
says, »Yesterday’s hero has become today’s villain, 
and yesterday’s villain, today’s martyr« (BR, 31). 
The point is that Lebanon’s political and public 
cultures have not had the benefit of any adequate 
means through which to expose the present to the 
past. To borrow Foucault’s terms, in Lebanon the-
re hasn’t been much art of government concerning 
remembrance of the civil war. According to the 
terms of the Amnesty Law, everyone and no one 
are equally guilty and equally innocent – except 
for those supplementary figures of ambivalence 
that work to render the difference between pollu-
ted and pure, profane and sacred, manageable as 
absolute, reconciliatory terms of reference.
Makdisi’s approach to memory, I want to sug-
gest, resists a notion of reconciliation based on the 
employment of amnesty as a formal production of 
amnesia. This is because her memoir is not only 
concerned with memory of the civil war, with a 
chapter of Lebanese history that is formally disre-
membered, »quarantined«,12 but also works to fa-
shion a particular approach to the force of memory 
as residue or remainder. This manifold, many-si-
ded remainder circling through Lebanon’s vari-
ous publics and communities,13 as well as forms of 
cultural production, is precisely what the political 
expediency of the Amnesty Law cannot formally 
admit, based as it is on a strategy to maintain a 
semblance of reconciliation at all costs – a recon-
ciliation encompassing a fall into time as a form of 
political currency. Where the logic of the Amnesty 
Law effectively closes off the present from expo-
11 Quoted by Raed El Rafei, »Lebanon’s post-conflict 
strategies debated«. Daily Star, December 5, 2005.
12 This is Michael Humphrey’s term, who observes that 
»In postwar Lebanon the past was also quarantined...« See 
his The Politics of Atrocity and Reconciliation: From Terror 
to Trauma. Routledge, London, 2002, 122. We could also say 
that the Amnesty Law works not only to quarantine the past, 
but more significantly the present. This »quarantining« in-
forms history textbooks used in Lebanon’s public schools, 
which still make no reference to the civil war. See Hassan 
M. Fattah, »Lebanon’s history textbooks sidestep its civil 
war«. International Herald Tribune, January 10, 2007. As Fat-
tah observes, »History seems to simply come to a halt in the 
early 1970s...«
13 What has otherwise been called »memory cultures«. 
See Sune Haugbolle, War and Memory in Lebanon. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010.
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memoir, Prager tends to underestimate how in re-
collecting past events and experiences the present 
itself undergoes a process of collection, or what 
we could call a gathering. This gathering implica-
tes, or enfolds, and does not quite dispel the force 
of scattering, as aspects of the past flash up and 
question how the present is held together: how, 
in Makdisi’s words, »events call up moments that 
flash out of my past and interpret the present«. 
This flashing up of the past as an interpretation 
of the present works to question the tacit strategy 
of dismemory encompassed by the manufactured 
proximity of amnesty and amnesia.
Excavating the Present
We could say that the present is not only inter-
preted, but comes to be interrupted, in the ety-
mological sense of breaking apart, as well as in a 
detemporalised bracketing from past and future, 
of putting the present into relief from any Pan-
glossian teleology. To interrupt suggests a rift, a 
rupture, so that the semblance of reconciliation 
is shattered, broken apart. A documentary film 
by Akram Zaatari wonderfully demonstrates this 
breaking apart by exposing the various rifts, stra-
tegies and misgivings haunting the post-civil war 
present of Lebanon. First shown in 2004, In This 
House is about the digging of a garden in 2002 to 
retrieve a letter that a former fighter, now journa-
list, had buried at a house twelve years earlier, at 
the end of the civil war. The fighter and his group 
had occupied the abandoned house for about six 
years. Before withdrawing he felt compelled to 
write a letter to the owners explaining why he and 
his companions had occupied the house and how 
they took care not to damage or destroy it. Much 
of Zaatari’s documentary focuses on the digging 
of the garden to find the letter, with a split screen 
whose other side presents an interview with the 
former fighter, explaining his motives in writing 
and burying the letter. 
Zaatari himself has described this digging as 
an »excavation«,19 in both metaphorical and literal 
terms of association. The final word of the film, as 
the letter is retrieved, is a brief comment by a boy, 
who says an exasperated, long-winded »baaaaas!«, 
in this context meaning »is that all?!« The com-
ment says something about the expectations of 
those involved in the incident, and how expecta-
tions played a role in the eventual significance of 
the letter. Both the digging and the filming of the 
digging attracted the attention of the army,police, 
and intelligence all of whom expect that something 
important would be revealed, something that 
should be controlled, perhaps even better kept 
buried, concealed and undocumented. Uncanni-
19 Interview with Laura Ghaninejad and  Jeremy Gravayat. 
http://www.derives.tv/spip.php?article493.
nerton calls »social habit-memory« (a notion that 
can be traced back to the work of Bergson and that 
Connerton distinguishes from Halbwachs’ more 
cognitive notion of »memory frameworks«) works 
to locate or incorporate bodies within specific mo-
dalities or patterns of social viability, the »per-
formance of codes and rules«.16 In fact it could be 
said that Proust’s insights straddle psychological 
and sociological approaches to the ways specific 
modalities of socialisation work as forms of perso-
nal subjectification, both constraining and enab-
ling certain capacities for social exchange, certain 
frameworks or patterns structuring and informing 
the social viability of self-constitution.
A recent work that accomplishes this straddling 
of disciplines in respect to memory studies is Jef-
frey Prager’s insightful monograph Presenting the 
Past, subtitled Psychoanalysis and the Sociology 
of Misremembering. Drawing on a particular case 
history of one of his patients, Prager manages to 
demonstrate how memory, rather than merely a re-
presentation of the past, is corporally »embodied« 
as lingering sensation, mediated through modali-
ties of socialisation and personal experience, ulti-
mately »embedded« (rendered personally signifi-
cant) through established frameworks of narration 
and identification, viewed through a lens of pre-
sent concerns and exigencies. And yet for my pur-
poses his otherwise important distinction between 
»embeddedness« and »embodiment« remains too 
presentist. Both notions tend to position the pre-
sent as a stabilising point of departure for a »rein-
vention of the past«: 
Whereas considering memory’s embeddedness 
encourages us to pay 
attention to the influence of the present on the 
recovery of the past, 
considering memory’s embodiedness directs 
our attention to the ways 
in which feeling states and bodily desires, in-
herited from the past but 
prevailing in the present, can rewrite the past 
in the service of the present.17 
While I don’t want to altogether deny the value 
and perhaps exigency of this presentist outlook,18 
for the approach I want to take towards Makdisi’s 
16 Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1989, 36.
17 Jeffrey Prager, Presenting the Past: Psychoanalysis 
and the Sociology of Misremembering. Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 1998, 83.
18 Especially concerning the need to work through per-
sonal trauma, and the way in which this working through 
(durcharbeiten, an important term for Freud), as Prager 
compellingly shows, appropriates (in both senses of the 
term: takes and renders personally relevant) socially con-
stituting »frames of meaning« or »frames of experience« 
circulating through public cultures. 
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ly, these people become participants in Zaatari’s 
film, even though they remain unidentified. But 
the point I want to make is that, through the film, 
the shifting, filtering significance of the letter, we 
could say, comes to be transposed from memory of 
an event to an event of memory. What comes to be 
excavated is not merely something of the past, but 
precisely the present. And not only is the present 
excavated and prised open, interpreted by the in-
choate past, it is also interrupted. This is to say 
that the semblance of reconciliation is shattered 
and broken apart, as those institutions – the army, 
the police, the intelligence agency – that serve ves-
ted interests in maintaining the semblance of re-
conciliation are constrained to expose themselves.
Memory Dwelling
To speak of memory as a gathering and scattering, 
in terms of the shifting, filtering, transposing 
force of its eventuating significance, is to suggest 
how its vagrant residues and remainders come to 
initiate a capacity to critically, reflexively, dwell 
in the present. This sense of dwelling in the pre-
sent can be conceptualised by noting how memory 
sustains not merely bodily performance enacted 
through rites and rituals, but also residues whose 
significance for an understanding of self and cir-
cumstance come into view through efforts to situ-
ate and make a destructuring sense of the present, 
not merely the past. Residues can be defined as re-
mainders, as refuse and waste whose filtering ren-
ders possible the construction and maintenance of 
self-understanding through time. In the process, 
time itself comes to be (from a phenomenological 
point of view: comes into Being as a constitutive 
or productive modality of subjectivity), ordered 
through the anachronic labour of narrative to 
structure relationships between past, present and 
future. In a related sense – one that emerges from 
and informs the structure of Makdisi’s fragmen-
ting approach to memory – to dwell in the present 
also involves a capacity to listen to the inchoate 
past, in a way that self-understanding becomes 
contingent on how the inchoate past emerges and 
comes to address the present as a questioning of 
motivations and expectations. This more reflexi-
ve occupation of dwelling, then, is initiated, as I 
have said, through a transposition of memory as 
memory of an event to the event of memory. As the 
etymology of the term inchoate suggests, aspects 
of the past come into view as a beginning, an ini-
tiation of both past and self into a present broken 
apart, that is to say destructured, by the fragmen-
ting force of memory.
The concept of gathering brings into proximity 
past and present, aspects of which come into view 
as the eventuating significance of memory. But as 
a gathering, this proximity implicates or enfolds 
an irrecoverable gap, one that has the potential to 
question how past and present are gathered and 
rendered coherent. In his essay »Building, Dwel-
ling, Thinking« Heidegger speaks of a bridge over 
a river as a construction that »gathers« (versam-
melt) and »initiates« (geleiten, which more literally 
means escort or accompany, with the connotation 
of safeguarding). The building of a bridge becomes 
a »dwelling« because it initiates or escorts proxi-
mity: a bridge »does not just connect banks that 
are already there. The banks emerge as banks 
only as the bridge crosses the stream...With the 
banks, the bridge brings to the stream the one and 
the other expanse of the landscape lying behind 
them. It brings stream and bank and land into 
each other’s neighbourhood. The bridge gathers 
the earth as landscape around the stream.«20 This 
gathering, as I have said, presupposes and does 
not quite cancel out the force of scattering. Once 
we approach reconciliation as one particular form 
of gathering – the Amnesty Law’s tacit memoriali-
sation of dismemory – we approach the possibili-
ty of »unlearning«, »destructuring« (Heidegger’s 
terms) or disinhabiting incorporated presupposi-
tions (Connerton’s or Bergson’s »habit-memory«21), 
rendering them available for critical practice 
through the consequent emergence of their scat-
tering, through the excavation, the breaking apart 
of the present.
But how can we talk or think of memory as dwel-
ling? How can dwelling be thought as a site for 
this disinhabiting altercation between gathering 
and scattering? How does dwelling structure and 
inform memory? Or, we can also ask, how does 
memory provoke and destructure dwelling? Such 
questions presuppose an intimation that memory 
and dwelling are not of the same category – the 
former mostly attuned to and structured by the ca-
pacity of narrative to process time, the latter by 
space and landscape. And yet to approach memory 
as dwelling may well allow us to think through the 
intersection of time and space, in respect to how 
we come to be carried by imaginative and symbolic 
associations that somehow always constrain and 
guide the terms by which we develop capacities to 
gather ourselves towards self-constitution and so-
cial viability. This capacity must learn to process 
time and space, both of which are to be inhabited, 
and which come to inhabit selfhood in the throes 
of its coming into being. Rites, rituals, memorials 
and commemorations no doubt play a major role in 
20 Martin Heidegger, »Building, Dwelling, Thinking«. 
Translated by Albert Hofstadter. In Martin Heidegger, Basic 
Writings. Edited by David Farrell Krell. Routledge, London, 
2011, 248. 
21 For an informative discussion of »habit memory« and 
»collective memory«, in respect to Connerton, Bergson, and 
Halbwachs, see Anne Whitehead, Memory. Routledge, Lon-
don, 2009, especially chapter 4. It should be clear that I am 
more interested in a concept of memory as critical, trans-
formative practice – as disinhabiting, rather than habituat-
ing.
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of thought – memory does not relate to continuity, 
to preservation, to reconciliation, but rather to a 
rift, an opening whereby one’s assumption of self 
and circumstance, one’s habituation, is disrupted, 
is provoked into the possibility of interpretation.
I couldn’t help reading Heidegger’s/Hölderlin’s 
»uninterpreted« as uninterrupted, so as to suggest 
a sense of memory as an occasion in which tem-
porality would be provoked into an awareness of 
finitude – less a possessive thought or an activity 
of securing continuity, or else marking out a te-
leological structure of discontinuity, than being 
induced to have to negotiate contingency. In other 
words, with Makdisi, dwelling provokes memory 
into a telling of interruptions, of that which fails 
to readily fit habitual, reconciliatory schemes of 
self- and other-understanding. In this sense memo-
ry clears the way by which one may give oneself to 
that which remains to be heard, that which remains 
to be told – the inchoate, stammering, provocative 
sounds of a telling or saying that has the potential 
to corrupt the strategic pact of reconciliation. The 
past emerges in the present, as the present is con-
strained to listen to what the past has to say, as 
the trace of an implacable, stuttering remainder 
constrains the present into a scattering, into »un-
concealment« (a translation of Heidegger’s prefer-
red term for alētheia, truth) into a semblance or a 
showing of truth. Conversely, reconciliation con-
strued through the pact of amnesty and amnesia 
constitutes a rather opportunistic form of dwel-
ling, a bridge that initiates a caricature of past and 
present, whereby both are suitably quarantined.
II
How can I write about Beirut? How can I collect 
it all into one volume: the
years of pain; of watching a world collapse 
while trying to stave off that 
collapse; the layers of memories and hopes, of 
tragedy and even sometimes
comedy, of violence and kindness, of courage 
and fear? (BF, 19)
What calls on Makdisi to write her memoir, the-
se intense fragments collected and transposed as 
bits and pieces of a self and city undergoing and 
somehow enduring their disintegration? How, in 
answering this call, is she led through the rubble 
and ruins of self and city towards a gathering of 
herself, her circumstances, her present – giving 
herself to an emerging past addressing her, inter-
preting her, interrupting and goading or prompting 
her capacity for an understanding of self and cir-
cumstance? How do the utterly chaotic incidents of 
the war induce her to give herself over to a labour 
of memory that works towards the possibility of 
initiating her grasp of self and circumstance? We 
can also ask, in terms of the non-reconciliatory, 
fragmenting momentum of her memoir, how does 
rendering memory personally and socially consti-
tutive through the intersection of space and time. 
But I want to suggest that it is through the practice 
of storytelling, of telling and hearing stories, that 
memory-dwelling emerges as a site for the gathe-
ring and exchange of self in both personal and so-
cial registers. Situating memory by means of an 
emphasis on narrative challenges Nora’s influen-
tial proposition that »There are lieux de memoire, 
sites of memory, because there are no longer mili-
eux de memoire, real environments of memory«22 
– a claim that dismisses the hermeneutical scope 
of the informal circulation of stories, »real envi-
ronments of memory«, as community, cultural and 
popular networks of memory.
Again, Heidegger’s work is instructive. Alt-
hough in his essay on dwelling he does not broach 
the theme of memory, it was not very far from 
his thoughts. In the same years – 1951-1952 – he 
lectured on the theme of thinking, where he de-
scribed memory (Gedächtnis) as »the gathering 
of thought«.23 It is a gathering because it is a 
»thinking back«, a »thinking back to what is to be 
thought«. This sense of gathering, similar to his 
notion of a bridge as that which constitutes an ini-
tiation into proximity through dwelling, encompas-
ses both possessive and dispossessive registers. 
Thus, as Heidegger asks, »to what« is memory the 
gathering of thought? And answers: »To what holds 
us, in that we give it thought precisely because 
it remains what must be thought about. What is 
thought is the gift given in thinking back...«24 Just 
as one gathers, we could say, one is also gathered. 
Thinking back calls upon or collects what gives its-
elf to thought, as well as a giving of oneself in the 
present to what remains to be thought, what provo-
kes the temporal structure of thought, »the time in 
which we are an uninterpreted sign«. In the words 
of Hölderlin that Heidegger quotes, »We are a sign 
that is not read…« Memory thus has transitive or 
transpositional force, perhaps in distinction to 
remembrance, which connotes a more static ana-
lytic. But more than this, it is related to a thin-
king that gives itself to a remainder, to that which 
comes to be »thought-provoking«, so that memory 
comes to surprise us, provokes us into scattering, 
provoking us to re-collect shards of experience 
and bring us to the point where we may begin to 
understand how such remainders have worked 
to make sense of us, in the process transforming 
them into signs that can be read. As a gathering 
of thought, as a fragmenting force – as an initi-
ating, critical capacity to embark on a gathering 
22 Pierre Nora, »Between Memory and History: Les Lieux 
de Memoire«. Representations, 26, Spring 1989, 7.
23 »What calls for Thinking«. In Krell, op cit, 261. In the 
English language one often says »I gather« as a substitute 
for »I think.«
24 Ibid, my emphasis. 
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palpable in extreme circumstances, such as those 
in Beirut during the civil war. The sudden physical 
disappearance of a landmark, or its sudden physi-
cal appearance as an abject pile of concrete and 
metal rubble, taunts one’s imaginative and sym-
bolic awareness of the space around them, one’s 
»haptic sense« of the physical environment.27 
In the words of Bloom and Moore this haptic 
sense is interactive and constitutive: 
The interplay between the world of our bodies 
and the world of our dwelling 
places is always in flux. We make places that 
are an expression of our haptic
experiences even as these experiences are ge-
nerated by the places we have 
already created. Whether we are conscious or 
innocent of this process, our 
bodies and our movements are in constant dia-
logue with our buildings.28
The shapes and contours of buildings inform 
not merely the functional relevance and aesthe-
tic appeal of their facades, entries and passages, 
but also the apparently vacant space surrounding 
them. We could say that his vacant space, this re-
mainder, comes into being as a setting into relief 
by the contours of buildings. The haptic sense, si-
milar to Heidegger’s notion of dwelling, involves 
an »emotional spatiality«, embodied memories of 
the past, a »body image« traversing past and pre-
sent spatial experience.29 
Just inside eastern Beirut, on the border of 
what used to be called the »green line«, stands a 
bombed-out, half-destroyed yellow building who-
se remaining facade is dotted with bullet holes. It 
stands on a prominent corner, in between Sodeco 
– the shopping, cinema and business complex built 
soon after the civil war – and Monot, the trendy 
nightclub street that descends down towards Mar-
tyrs Square and Gemmayze. In recent years there 
has been a campaign to save the house from demo-
lition, to situate it as a monument to the civil war. 
As Mona Hallak, an architect who campaigned to 
save the building from developers, engaging the 
local government to acquire it as public proper-
ty, says: »We have been going into public amnesia 
since the civil war and anything that prevents that 
has to be preserved.«30 Now called Beit al-Madina, 
house of the city, or Beit Beirut, the building is to 
be turned into a museum, with sniper bunkers, 
the dental clinic of a former resident and artifacts 
from the war presented as exhibitions. A project 
27 See K. Bloom and C. Moore, Body, Memory, Architec-
ture. Yale University Press, New York, 1977.
28 Ibid, 57.
29 Ibid, 46.
30 Quoted in »New Beirut museum will teach lessons of 
the Civil War«. In The Daily Star, October 18, 2008. 
memory become a site in which the irrecoverab-
le gap between past and present comes to render 
the writing of her memoir possible? Both past and 
present call on Makdisi, asking her for care, for 
nurture, for remembrance, before they slip into 
the folds of dismemory. How, in composing her 
memoir, does she manage to develop a relation-
ship of care to those residues and remainders that 
come to take form as an event of memory, emer-
ging through their eventuating significance? And 
further, how is the composition of her memoir, the 
seemingly smooth flow of words, able to provide a 
semblance of the chaos, desperation and trauma in 
which her fragments are immersed?
The extreme, traumatic circumstances in which 
Makdisi gives herself to memory, which she defi-
nes as »the last gasp of life«, impel her to spend 
her shattered time and space writing a memoir. 
Until the last couple of decades, which in some 
places has seen a veritable explosion of »self-re-
presentational texts«,25 the writing of memoirs has 
tended to be regarded as an exercise of mature 
age, when mortality comes into view and more 
pressingly becomes an undeniable aspect of one’s 
self-understanding, one’s outlook. As the present 
can no longer be grasped through the for(e)getting 
of mortality, as the capacity to imagine a future is 
more acutely constrained to entertain finitude, the 
past emerges as a malleable texture that can serve 
one’s orientation, one’s capacity to gather and hold 
oneself together, to dwell in the present. Old age 
also involves a contracting corporal experience of 
space, as physical limitations tend to minimise and 
slow down movement. The house becomes almost 
the limit of one’s physical universe. 
To stay in tune with Makdisi’s memoir necessita-
tes a move from the Schwarzwald (the Black forest, 
Heidegger’s abode) to Beirut, turning Heidegger’s 
notion of gathering around so that the »initiation« 
brought into being as dwelling is set against the 
destruction of a bridge – not the constructive im-
plication of proximity but its destructive implica-
tion.26 If, in Heidegger’s terms, dwelling involves a 
gathering of self and the natural and built physical 
environment toward a productive modality of habi-
tat, toward neighbourhood, then what becomes of 
dwelling when this habitat and neighbourhood are 
violently destroyed? And not only in terms of sud-
den, one-off destruction, as in an earthquake, but 
as an almost daily, impending occurrence? Para-
doxically, if we turn Heidegger around, his insights 
become even more, not less, compelling, precisely 
because »dwelling« and »gathering« become more 
25 I borrow the observation and term from Leigh Gilmore, 
The Limits of Autobiography: Trauma and Testimony. Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 2001. Gilmore describes this pro-
digious output as a »memoir boom«.
26 Although the Schwarzwald was not spared the ravages 
of the Second World War.
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king sites of violence: kidnappings or killings of 
neighbours, barricades, bombed-out buildings, as 
well as the piles of garbage lying in the streets. 
For Makdisi such locations become »landmarks«, 
significant as sites of memory – if we understand 
»landmarks« or »sites« not so much in Nora’s struc-
turalist sense of an impersonal, formalised archi-
ve or monument (memory, he claims, is »no lon-
ger a social practice«32), but rather in Heidegger’s 
phenomenological sense (a thinking back to what 
interrupts the present and gives itself to thought) 
of what we have called a memory-dwelling. In such 
terms, the irrecoverable gap between past and 
present initiates the capacity of narrative to work 
as a gathering of both self and city – again, if we 
approach narrative in terms of Heidgger’s sense of 
a bridge, bringing past and present into proximity. 
The significance of such landmarks and their sub-
jectifying implications coming into being through 
destruction concern not only memory of the fate of 
particular friends or neighbourly acquaintances, 
but also concerning Makdisi’s capacity to main-
tain some sort of correspondence between physi-
cal changes to the urban landscape and changes 
within herself: »Each of these physical landmarks, 
and so many others like them, are milestones in 
my inner journey of pain. Memories wash over the 
map, and layers of time alter its shadings« (BF, 78).
Imaginary maps not only work to stitch together 
a disintegrating urban landscape, providing some 
form of orientation, but also work to stitch together 
the self. This stitching together has to employ a 
labour of narrative to bridge space and time, as 
an incessant initiation of correspondence or non-
correspondence between self and circumstance. 
Finding herself »lying at the heart of Beirut, foun-
dering in the foundering heart«, Makdisi’s very 
capacity to say »I« comes to be contingent on how 
she can employ narrative to negotiate a gathering/
scattering of self, ultimately projected into the fu-
ture as an expectation of death: »As I do stand a 
good chance of dying in this dangerous city, me-
taphor modulates into possible literalness. The 
muddled past, present, and future become all tied 
up together« (BF, 95). To untie this »muddle« ne-
cessitates an untying of self. Her ability to say »I« 
comes to be contingent on her capacity to project 
herself into the past, or to become acquainted with 
how the past projects her into the present.
Makdisi’s labour has its precedents with Pene-
lope and Shahrazad. Penelope, staying up at night 
to unweave what she had woven during the day, ne-
gotiating herself between her desire for the desire 
of her many suitors and an implacable law that de-
mands she quarantine her desire until the return of 
Odysseus. Shahrazad, spinning out story after story 
every night so as to act on both her fate and the nar-
32 Op. cit, 14.
consultant describes the museum as a »memori-
al«, though dedicated more to encouraging the 
present to take an interest in the past as an even-
tual site of dialogue and discussion. As the consul-
tant says, the house won’t be »a space dedicated to 
the dead, but a memorial to exchange and debates 
on history«.31 This interesting comment suggests, 
much like Makdisi’s approach to memory, that neit-
her past nor present are to be preserved, quaran-
tined, placed within the airless confines of a glass 
cabinet, but rather cared for and nurtured as sites 
in which both past and present emerge through 
their eventuating significance. In respect to haptic 
experience, or dwelling, where the building once 
informed a contraction of time and space, it now 
comes to initiate an expansion of time and space. 
Its remaining facade gains a capacity to initiate a 
more critical dwelling in the present.
Makdisi’s haptic sense of Beirut remains con-
vulsed in violence – not only divided between east 
and west, but also experienced in the throes of dai-
ly destruction, as a »crumbling reality« (BF, 22). 
Unpredictable and violent urban warfare initiates 
an experience of space and time as severe contrac-
tion – time contracted to the immediate present, 
space contracted to the house and the immediate 
neighbourhood – both contracted to almost bare 
necessity. The western side of Beirut where Mak-
disi resides is rent by competing local militias and 
regional forces, intent on mutilating and consecra-
ting the urban landscape. Refugees from the south 
crowd into west Beirut, occupying abandoned buil-
dings, or else constructing ramshackle shelters. 
These physical and demographic changes bring 
about »a shifting landscape of memories and sor-
row« (BF, 77).
And yet this initiation into contraction and mu-
tilation has somehow to be processed and integra-
ted, by drawing imaginary »maps« that can keep 
up with the disintegrating topography: 
We noticed these physical changes around us 
long before we noticed the 
changes within ourselves. We had to draw up a 
new map of our world, and
we had no instruments to assist us except our 
wits and our senses. And our
lives often depended on the accuracy of our 
construction, so it was a serious
business, drawing up this map (BF, 77).
Mapping is not only a topographical quest to 
keep up with the »shifting landscape«, but is also 
punctuated by the intersection of memory and lo-
cation – a street corner, a house, a road, all mar-
31 Quoted by Chirine Laoud, »Beirut landmark to be re-
stored as Beit Beirut museum«. In Ya Libnan, February 22, 
2011. http://www.yalibnan.com/2011/02/22/beirut-land-
mark-to-be-restored-as-beit-beirut-museum/ 
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text of urban destruction and post-war dismemory 
or hyperamnesia, literature for Khoury is charged 
with an urgency beyond any tendentious collusion 
of politics and aesthetics. Writing, he says, »be-
came a necessary means of survival. Naming the 
horror was a way to protect oneself from it« (ibid, 
138). In his creative work Khoury’s »city« and 
»memory« carry the semiotic burden of physical 
and civil destruction, rupture and disintegration, 
as well as a commitment not to patch them up with 
formulaic notions of reconciliation that serve to 
assimilate both present and past to an uncritical 
form of forgetfulness. With Makdisi, before city 
and self are patched up through reconstruction, 
it is well worth pondering how what she calls »the 
burden of memory« (BF, 102) presents an opportu-
nity to give oneself to the tremor of the yawning 
gap that reverberates between present and past. 
While this gap is always under threat of closure 
by the expediency of reconciliation, Makdisi’s ap-
proach to memory dazzles us because it does not 
imagine that narrative closure can once and for all 
be defeated, but only deferred, or delayed, much 
like Penelope’s deferral of acting on her desire, or 
Shahrazad’s wily deferral of her death, her creati-
ve deferral of narrative closure. 
Norman Saadi Nikro is Research fellow in the project 
»Transforming Memories: Cultural Production and Perso-
nal/Public Memory in Lebanon and Morocco« at the ZMO. 
rative of her fate. Makdisi’s labour of weaving, her 
»mapping«, stitching together time and space, is in-
cessantly unwoven by the disintegrating city. In res-
pect to the capacity of her labour of narrative to so-
mehow simulate an inescapable trauma that resists 
the terms of its representation, Makdisi’s weaving of 
self and circumstance is continually faced with its 
impossibility, its unweaving. As Gilmore says: »In-
sofar as trauma can be defined as that which breaks 
the frame, rebuilding a frame to contain it is as frau-
ght with difficulty as it is necessary.«33
In a short essay, »The Memory of the City«, 
Elias Khoury ponders how memory can be viable 
in a city ravaged by urban warfare. His musings 
are also directed to the vacuous rebuilding of the 
city centre, which Khoury describes as »an empty 
space, a placeless space, a hole in memory«.34 Once 
a popular, shaaby area for local markets, trade, en-
tertainment, transport and social exchange, post-
war planning and rebuilding of the centre of Bei-
rut has transformed it into an exclusive shopping, 
cafe, restaurant, residential and business location. 
Arguably, the experience of space brought into 
being by the reconstruction involves a more pri-
vatised, commercialised form of social interaction 
(suggested by the absence of any public benches, 
particularly around the Place de l’Etoile). The hap-
tic sense initiated by the reconstruction tends to 
discourage any public concern with the immediate 
past, encouraging rather a gathering and bridging, 
a modality of social comportment (etymologically, 
bring together and collect), informing and infor-
med by what has been termed »the current hyper-
amnesia vogue«.35 In the midst of this »frightening 
architectural amnesia«, Khoury argues, which 
barely conceals the systematic destruction of the 
city, »the only place left for memory is literature«. 
As he goes on to say: »Where an architect works to 
establish differences, organize relationships, and 
define limits, a writer works to tear down these li-
mits, to transcend definitions, to open spaces onto 
one another«.36 
What is relevant for my reading of Makdisi’s me-
moir is how Khoury situates the exercise of nar-
rative as bridging (again, in Heidegger’s sense of 
bringing into proximity) space and memory so as 
to wrest present and past from the expediency of 
dismemory, or else a form of memory devoted more 
to the preservation of an archaic past (such as the 
excavation, preservation and celebration of anci-
ent ruins surrounding the city centre). In the con-
33 The Limits of Autobiography, 31.
34 Elias Khoury, »The Memory of the City«. Translated by 
Jean Stein. Grand Street, No 4. Autumn, 1995, 139.
35 J. Hanssen and D. Genberg, »Beirut in Memoriam: A 
Kaleidoscopic Space Out of Focus«. In: A. Neuwirth and A. 
Pflitsch (eds.), Crisis and Memory in Islamic Societies. Er-
gon-Verlag, Beirut/Würzburg, 2001, 245.
36 Memory of the City, 139.
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